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BOOK REVIEWS
ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION. By William C. Clay, Jr., In-
dianapolis, Indiana: The Research & Review Service of America, Inc.
1977. Pp. xi, 298. $19.95.
Reviewed by Robert S. Hightower2
Life is made difficult for the reviewer when an author achieves his
goals as well as Mr. Clay has in this estate planning text. The author's
purpose, "to stimulate" and provide exposure to the "infinite alterna-
tives and possibilities in estate planning," has been accomplished. In
the process Mr. Clay has produced an estate planning "idea book"
that should be in the library of every estate planner, whether an
attorney, life underwriter, or trust officer.
The textual format begins appropriately enough with the task
faced by every practitioner: persuading the client that estate planning
is an ongoing process that involves planning for the client's remaining
years as well as for others after death. The reader is then introduced
to the various estate planning considerations and possibilities, includ-
ing marital deduction plans, powers of appointment, trusts, buy-sell
agreements, life insurance, gifts and charitable bequests. Throughout
these sections the author discusses certain aspects of the 1976 Tax Re-
form Acts that require new approaches to estate planning. Three
chapters are then devoted to a detailed discussion of the Tax Reform
Act, carryover basis rules, and generation-skipping transfers. The
author concludes with several extremely useful sections on probating
the will, making postmortem tax elections, and filing the required
income and estate tax returns.
Although Mr. Clay's work covers all pertinent estate planning
topics, he purposely does not provide extensive discussion of any single
area. A reader looking for an academic treatment will be disappointed
with this work. This reviewer recommends that this text be viewed
merely as an "idea book": it should be read at one's leisure with pen
in hand so that the reader might underline and make note of those
concepts and plans he or she was unaware of or had forgotten about.
Viewed as such, the work serves several different purposes. First, for
the experienced estate planner it provides a brief but complete intro-
duction to the Tax Reform Act of 1976. Further, it affords such a
1. William C. Clay, Jr. is a member of the Kentucky Bar. He practices law in Mt.
Sterling, Kentucky, specializing in tax and estate planning.
2. Associate, Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor, Tallahassee, Florida.
B.A., University of South Florida, 1971; J.D., Florida State University, 1975; LL.M. (in
Taxation), New York University, 1976.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
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practitioner a means to review his or her estate planning methods
and forms, to update them where necessary, and to consider additional
possibilities and plans to better achieve clients' objectives. The work
is also designed for the young attorney just starting an estate planning
practice. The beginning estate planning practitioner will be well
advised to review the text carefully and to employ it as one of his
or her basic estate planning tools. While Mr. Clay's work does not
answer all conceivable questions, it does provide a basic treatment of
the foundation of estate planning principles and concepts.
Although the text appears to have accomplished Mr. Clay's purposes,
it must be criticised for some obvious deficiencies. First, the author
has purposely omitted those "burdensome" footnotes and citations
[p. viii]. One must question: To whom are they a burden? They are
most certainly not a burden to the beginning practitioner who seeks
to learn the citation to the revenue procedure referred to on page 20
of the text dealing with the disallowance of the marital deduction in
certain cases. Citation to authority also would be useful to the busy
practitioner who is trying to understand the new carryover basis rules.
While this reviewer agrees with the author that extensive footnotes,
such as those found in the supplements to Casner's Estate Planning,
are burdensome to the reader and author alike, basic citations to Code
sections, Treasury Regulations, and Revenue Rulings and Procedures
are extremely useful. They are helpful both to the busy practitioner
who is trying to find the path through the 1976 Tax Reform Act and
to the inexperienced among us who are attempting to plan estates
without falling into traps.4
There is a second reason why this estate planning text does not
escape criticism. As with other treatises on the subject, Mr. Clay's
focus is on the individual for whom estate planning can save taxes.
Far too little attention is given to the subject of the young family
with minor children, large potential debts, and an estate consisting
principally of life insurance.5 At the very least, every estate planning
text should allocate one chapter to such factual situations and to the
subjects of custody of minors, and guardianships and trusts for minors.
It is unfortunate that this category of persons comprising such a sub-
stantial percentage of the population receives so little attention on
the part of most estate planning writers.
In spite of the foregoing, this reviewer has found Mr. Clay's text
4. The revenue procedure discussed on page 20 of the text is Revenue Procedure
64-19, 1964-1 Cum. Bull. 682, and the carryover basis rules are contained in section 1023
of the Internal Revenue Code.
5. See Martin, The Draftsman Views Wills for a Young Family, 54 N. CAR. L. Rv.
277 (1976), for a welcome exception.
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to be a most useful and thought-provoking idea book for post-tax
reform estate planning. The benefits obtained by this reviewer were
well worth the time spent reading it, and the work will undoubtedly
be skimmed several more times as this reviewer develops and revises
his practice.
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THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE. By
Leon Jaworski. 1 New York: Reader's Digest Press; Houston: Gulf
Publishing Co. 1976. Pp. 305. $9.95 New York: Pocket Books. Pp. 372.
$2.50.
Reviewed by Barry D. Halpern2
On November 5, 1973, Leon Jaworski, a former Nazi war crimes
prosecutor and past president of the American Bar Association, took
the oath of office as the second Watergate Special Prosecutor. He
assumed that post less than a month after his predecessor, Harvard
Law School professor Archibald Cox, had been fired. During his
eleven-month tenure, Jaworski directed the operation of five task forces,
secured indictments against an array of high administration officials,
and maintained a precarious balance between the White House, two
congressional investigating committees, and an ambitious grand jury.
The mere creation of the special prosecution force was in itself a re-
markable development in our constitutional system, but the results
attained by Jaworski and his staff will unquestionably be recalled as a
historical milestone.
In The Right and the Power, Jaworski recounts his task in re-
strained prose, yet his recollections are those of a very able legal
technician who employed all of his skills in the prosecution of a case
that, in his words, "proved what we teach in schools, it proved . . .
that no man is above the law." The book traces Jaworski's Watergate
experience from his arrival in Washington in the wake of the "Saturday
Night Massacre" through the Nixon resignation and the subsequent
delays during which the Congress, the special prosecution force, and
the new President wrestled with the formidable task of disposing of
criminal charges against a former chief executive. This compact
1. Leon Jaworski received his LL.B. from Baylor University in 1925 and an LL.M.
from George Washington University in 1926. Following World War II, he served as
Chief of the War Crimes Trial Section of the United States Army in the European
Theatre. He was president of the American Bar Association 1971-72. After resigning
as Watergate Special Prosecutor, he returned to the firm of Fulbright and Jaworski,
Houston, Texas. On July 20, 1977, Jaworski agreed to become Special Counsel for the
House Ethics Committee's investigation of South Korean influence-buying among
lawmakers. As he did in the Watergate investigation, Jaworski conditioned acceptance
of the job on the committee's giving him full cooperation and wide-ranging powers.
N.Y. Times, July 21, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
2. Member of the Florida and Kansas Bars.
3. T. WHITE, BREACH OF F~rrH: THE FALL OF RicHARD NIXON 6 (1975). Historian
Theodore White quotes Jaworski as saying that he accepted the Special Prosecutor
position not for reward or fame, but because he believed that the Watergate case would
shape the youth of America's perception of their political system for a generation. Id.
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volume provides a chronological review of the Watergate prosecutions,
an inside glimpse of the personalities who helped frame the events,
and an appendix containing status reports on the cases undertaken by
the special prosecution force. Although the book was written primarily
for the general reader, Jaworski's brief but incisive essays on pro-
fessional ethics, the prosecutorial function, and plea negotiations will
particularly appeal to the lawyers in his reading audience.
THE REVIVAL OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE
Although ostensibly cloaked with a charter guaranteeing him full
authority to pursue the Watergate investigation,4 Archibald Cox was
fired on October 20, 1973, after seeking to subpoena nine White House
tape recordings.5 Cox was terminated for refusing to acquiesce in the
"Stennis Proposal," a plan to circumvent the subpoena by allowing the
White House to submit expurgated transcripts too the court while
restricting further access to presidential tapes and documents.6 Im-
mediately following Cox's dismissal, the offices of the special prosecu-
tion force were sealed, its investigatory responsibility was returned to
the Department of Justice, and Judge John Sirica was informed that
the President would not comply with the federal district court order
for an in camera examination of the subpoenaed tapes. The President,
however, grossly underestimated the public reaction to his abrupt
assertion of power. Within days, the storm of protest forced the
White House to capitulate and search for a second special prosecutor.
On October 30, 1973, White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig
dispatched an Air Force jet to bring Leon Jaworski to Washington to
discuss the job. Originally reluctant to assume the post, Jaworski
accepted after Haig assured him that the President would authorize
4. 28 C.F.R. § 0.37-.38 (1976). The charter was first promulgated at 38 Fed. Reg.
30,738-39 (1973).
5. On November 14, 1973, U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard Gesell ruled that
the firing of Archibald Cox without proof of extraordinary impropriety was illegal. Nixon
had ordered Attorney General Elliott Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson, who had
recommended Cox for the position, refused to do so and resigned. Deputy Attorney
General William Ruckelshaus also refused to comply with Nixon's order and was then
discharged from his job. Solicitor General Robert Bork, who had been appointed
Acting Attorney General, agreed to remove Cox from office. L. JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT
AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JAWORSKI].
In a suit filed by consumer advocate Ralph Nader, the court cited the Justice Depart-
ment regulations that established the office and concluded that acting Attorney General
Robert Bork's abolishment of the position was "simply a ruse to permit the discharge
of Mr. Cox .... " Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1973).
6. For a detailed first-hand account of the events surrounding the Cox firing and
"Saturday Night Massacre," see Richardson, The Saturday Night Massacre, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1976, at 40.
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a new charter guaranteeing the Special Prosecutor greater independence
of action, including the right to take the President to court."
With neither anger nor false modesty Jaworski recalls the tension
and suspense that clouded his first days as Special Prosecutor. The
New York Times suggested that Jaworski was "fatally handicapped
from the outset because he enters the Watergate investigation as the
President's man ... ."8 Congress had debated the wisdom of creating
a special prosecution office outside the executive branch; and the
young staff inherited from Cox waited expectantly for Jaworski to
prove his mettle by pursing the investigation to the White House.
During those first weeks even Jaworski's optimism was strained. He
admits that his staff did not rally around him, and his early overtures
to the White House met with a studied disdain that led him "to
experience the frustration that must have acidized Cox's stomach."9
By mid-December Jawoski's sense of frustration had been replaced
by a shocked realization of presidential complicity to an extent un-
imagined when he accepted the call to Washington. After receiving
a subpoenaed tape of several March 21, 1973, conversations between
Richard Nixon and his closest aides, Jaworski realized that his hopes
for White House cooperation would have to be abandoned. Though
he had expected to find wrongdoing, the Special Prosecutor admitted
being severely shaken by evidence of the President's sordid under-
taking.1o He directed his staff to begin assembling a criminal case
against Richard Nixon after listening to a taped voice that he had
"heard before in person and on radio and television, so decidedly
different now, as the President plotted with his aides to defeat the
ends of justice."'"
The case against Mr. Nixon, like those involving lesser Watergate
defendants, was built on a framework of evidence compiled primarily
as the result of painstaking plea negotiations. That aspect of the prose-
cution, however, generated frequent and adamant criticism. In his
memoir, Jaworski stoutly defends the use by his staff of plea bargains
7. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 5-7. The promise to grant the Special Prosecutor
greater independence was incorporated into the new charter. 28 C.F.R. § 0.38 appendix.
The order was promulgated at 38 Fed. Reg. 30,738-39, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg.
32,805 (1973). That amendment states: "[T]he Special Prosecutor will not be removed
from his duties except for extraordinary improprieties" and not without the consensus
of the "Majority and the Minority Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority
Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives ....'"
It also says that the Special Prosecutor's jurisdiction will not be circumscribed without
the consensus of the same eight congressional members. Id.
8. JAWoRsKI, supra note 5, at 13.
9. Id. at 22.
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id.
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negotiated with a view toward disclosure of misconduct at increasingly
sensitive levels of the Nixon administration. Nevertheless, Jaworski's
use of plea bargaining subjected him to criticism for seeming to deal
more sympathetically with certain established Vatergate defendants
than with their younger colleagues.
The author devotes nearly a chapter to an explanation of his de-
cision to breach the established special prosecution force policy by
accepting a misdemeanor plea in the case of Richard G. Kleindienst.12
Though the force ordinarily negotiated only felony pleas, the Klein-
dienst case was a notable exception to that rule. Jaworski recalls
laboring over the peculiar circumstances that attended the decision of
the former acting Attorney General to give false testimony to the Senate
Judiciary Committee.1 3 Several members of the staff disagreed with
Jaworski's treatment of Kleindienst; three resigned in protest after
Kleindienst was allowed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor.'
Jaworski takes similar pains in recounting the extenuating circum-
stances in the case of Herbert W. Kalmbach. Although the former
personal counsel to Richard Nixon raised enormous sums for his
client's campaign coffers and admitted retailing at least one ambassador-
ship, Jaworski describes the California attorney as "a not-very-smart
errand runner."1 5 As in the Kleindienst case, the Special Prosecutor
wrote a lengthy philosophical memorandum to clarify his position on
the Kalmbach plea negotiations. Characterizing him as a "shallow
minded . . . lackey,"' 6 Jaworski decided against charging Kalmbach
with a felony in the coverup conspiracy. He chose instead to accept
a felony plea to a Corrupt Practices Act violation and a single count
misdemeanor plea for the sale of an ambassadorship.'1 7
12. Id. at 149. Kleindienst was allowed to plead guilty on May 16, 1974, to a one-
count violation of 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970) for refusal to answer pertinent questions
before a Senate Committee. Since Kleindienst's testimony was evasive, the statute was
broadly construed to accommodate the charge desired by his counsel. JAWORSKI, supra
note 5, at 154-55.
13. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 151-54.
14. Id. at 155.
15. Id. at 79.
16. Id. at 78.
17. Kalmbach pleaded guilty on February 25, 1974, to a one-count violation of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, §§ 303, 314, 43 Stat. 1071,
and one count of promising federal employment as a reward for political activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1974). JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 77, 287. Kalmbach is
viewed less sympathetically in a recent article written by an attorney who served on
the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry staff. Adler, Searching for the
Real Nixon Scandal, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1976, at 76. In that article Kalmbach
is described as a man who elicited considerable sympathy by claiming to have been
used by the White House. Ms. Adler suggests, however, that Kalmbach actively solicited
political assignments that were, at best, of doubtful legality. Id. at 92.
19771
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Plea bargaining demands difficult decisions within the framework
of prosecutorial discretion, yet Jaworski's handling of Kleindienst and
Kalmbach contrasts sharply with the manner in which he dealt with
younger Watergate defendants. Jaworski was less inclined to let
sympathy temper his judgment in dealing with young White House
assistants. The case of former presidential aide Egil Krogh furnishes a
prime example. Although Jaworski acknowledges Krogh's sincere
repentence, 18 he certainly did not strain to find "peculiar circumstances"
to mitigate the young attorney's guilt:
Now the young, fine-looking lawyer was in our offices saying that he
no longer could use the umbrella of national security as a defense
against the crimes with which he had been charged. My immediate
feeling was sadness that power's corruption had tainted him and
other young men of bright promise. But tainted he had been, wrongs
he had done. Now he was in our hands.19
While Egil Krogh and several of his White House colleagues found
their careers shattered by the Special Prosecutor's insistence on felony
pleas, Kleindienst received a suspended sentence and promptly returned
to the private practice of law.
Jaworski's lengthy discussions of the Kleindienst and Kalmbach
cases suggest that the author remains sensitive to the criticism fostered
by his decisions. Nevertheless, he is steadfast in his advocacy of the
plea bargaining process, and he argues persuasively that such negotia-
tions were instrumental in uncovering and prosecuting the Watergate
conspiracy.
THE BATTLE AND ITS AFTERMATH
His shocked realization of pervasive presidential complicity and
increasing frustration with dilatory White House tactics compelled
Jaworski to move on two fronts in early 1974. First, he directed his
staff to compile a detailed report outlining Richard Nixon's criminal
involvement. The report was intended for transmittal to the House
Judiciary Committee which had by that time initiated its impeach-
ment inquiry. Then, tiring of stalls, he requested a subpoena from
Federal District Judge Sirica for tapes and documents relating to
selected conversations between the President and his closest aides.
The book provides an inside account of the unprecedented relation-
ship between the special prosecution force and the congressional com-
18. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 35.
19. Id. at 31.
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mittees which were conducting parallel inquiries.2 0 One complex
facet of the case involved the special prosecution force's contact with
the House Judiciary Committee. Since his staff's 128-page outline of
evidence against Richard Nixon had been compiled from materials
cloaked with the secrecy of a grand jury proceeding, Jaworski's desire
to cooperate with the congressional committees required the sanction
of the federal district court. He surmounted that problem by devising
a plan by which the grand jury would tender a sealed report to the
court for transmittal to the House Judiciary Committee. Although
challenged by two conspiracy codefendants, Jaworski's plan was
sustained, and the "road map" was delivered on March 25, 1974.21
In another chapter the author outlines the evidence against the
seven Watergate coverup codefendants.22 Though he describes the
arraignment of a former Attorney General and six other former White
House officials as a "heart-rending moment," he recalls no signs of
remorse by the defendants as they stood before the bar of Judge John
Sirica's court. In a twelve-page description of the case against the
seven codefendants, Jaworski traces the evolution of the conspiracy
from Gordon Liddy's hyperactive imagination to the blackmail dis-
cussions that took place in the Oval Office. 3 While other Watergate
commentators have described in detail the million-dollar "Gemstone"
plan for kidnapping, burglary, and bugging, Jaworski leaves little
doubt as to the former President's involvement in the coverup
conspiracy.
After turning the "road map" over to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, Jaworski renewed his efforts to secure tapes of presidential
20. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, popularly
known as the Ervin Committee, was charged with investigating illegal, improper and
unethical activities in the presidential election of 1972, and with recommending legisla-
tion necessary to safeguard the electoral process. See 1 Hearings Before the Select
Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1973). The House Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of New Jersey
Democrat Peter Rodino, conducted the House impeachment inquiry. 1 Impeachment
Inquiry: Hearings Before the Comm. of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. ii (1974).
21. Although the President did not object to transmittal of the report, H.R.
Haldeman and Gordon C. Strachan, two coverup codefendants, sought a writ of manda-
mus to block its delivery. Noting that the case dealt with a matter of critical moment
to the nation, Judge Sirica concluded that "delivery to the Committee is eminently
proper, and indeed, obligatory .... In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972
Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370
F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (D.D.C. 1974).
22. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 109-33. H.R. Haldeman, John D. Ehrlichman, John
N. Mitchell, Charles W. Colson, Kenneth W. Parkinson, Robert C. Mardian and Gordon
C. Strachan were indicted in the coverup conspiracy.
23. Id. at 111-22.
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conversations. Following nearly a month of frustrating negotiations
with White House attorney James St. Clair, the Special Prosecutor filed
a motion on April 16, 1974, requesting tapes and documents pertaining
to sixty-four conversations between Nixon and aides John Dean, H. R.
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and Charles Colson. The President
responded to the subpoena with a motion to quash and a nationally
televised promise to deliver transcripts of White House recordings.
Though the President's plan was coupled with a massive public rela-
tions campaign designed to pressure the Special Prosecutor into with-
drawing the subpoena, the transcripts were so poorly edited and
replete with errors that they were rejected by both Jaworski and the
House Judiciary Committee.2 4
James St. Clair's motion to quash confronted Jaworski with a
ticklish problem. Two months earlier the grand jury had voted
unanimously to name Richard Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator
in the coverup case. Now, argument on the motion might compel
disclosure of that bombshell while the House Judiciary Committee,
still seething over the President's decision to disobey the Committee's
own subpoena for nineteen tapes, debated articles of impeachment.
Jaworski, anxious to avoid the potentially prejudicial effect of dis-
closing the grand jury's action, attempted once more to compromise.
The President, however, rejected a proposal to trim the subpoena to
eighteen tapes. That decision led Jaworski to believe that the tapes
would destroy the President's position, and convinced him that Mr.
Nixon was concealing the extent of his involvement from his remaining
staff and attorneys:
I did not think that Haig, for all his advocacy of the President's
position, would close his eyes against what he considered clear-cut
proof of Nixon's criminality. St. Clair on several occasions had said
he never listened to the tapes. I believed him: he spoke and acted
only when the President instructed him to do S0.25
Jaworski's cryptic observation notwithstanding, James St. Clair
proved himself an able advocate at the hearing on the President's
motion to quash. As anticipated, St. Clair relied heavily on the doctrine
of "executive privilege"; but much to Jaworski's dismay, the Presi-
dent's attorney also argued that the Special Prosecutor lacked standing
to pursue the subpoena before the court. When reminded of
Alexander Haig's pre-appointment promise that Jaworski would be
24. Id. at 131-33.
25. Id. at 136.
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free to go to court, St. Clair replied that the question of jurisdiction
was not a matter that could be waived or stipulated by the parties.26
Although Judge Sirica sustained the Special Prosecutor's standing and
ordered issuance of the subpoena, the confrontation over the presi-
dential tapes set the stage for the final decisive battle before the Supreme
Court.
On May 24, 1974, Jaworski petitioned the Supreme Court for
certiorari before judgment, seeking to bypass the court of appeals on
the basis of imperative public interest.27 The petition was granted
and argument scheduled for July 8. St. Clair's brief argued that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to intervene in an intra-branch dispute
between the President and the Special Prosecutor and that the district
court erred in refusing to quash for failure to demonstrate the unique
and compelling need required by Nixon v. Siric 2s to overcome the
claim of executive privilege. Jaworski's brief contended that the
subpoena duces tecum was merely a traditional mechanism necessary
to procure evidence in a federal criminal prosecution involving former
White House officials. Though conceding the possibility of privilege,
Jaworski's brief suggested:
The qualified executive privilege for confidential intra-govern-
mental deliberations, designed to promote the candid interchange
between officials and their aides, exists only to protect the legitimate
functioning of government. Thus, the privilege must give way
where, as here, it has been abused.29
On July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court accepted Jaworski's conten-
tion that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of what
the Constitution says. No doubt cognizant of Richard Nixon's threat to
ignore a less-than-definitive ruling, Chief Justice Warren Burger,
speaking for a unanimous Court, 0 chilled the White House by
26. Id. at 144.
27. Sup. Cr. R. 20 authorizes issuance of a writ of certiorari to review pending
cases before judgment in the courts of appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1970), a writ
of certiorari may be issued to the courts of appeal either before or after rendition of
judgment. The Supreme Court found that the federal district court's order denying
the President's motion to quash qualified as a "final" order and thus was properly re-
viewable before judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1291 (1970). United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974).
28. 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court treated the subpoenaed material as
presumptively privileged but rejected the President's claim of absolute executive privilege.
Concluding that the Special Prosecutor had demonstrated sufficient need for judicial
examination, the court required the President to turn the tapes over to the district
court for in camera review.
29. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 173.
30. Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the decision.
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addressing the President's claim of privilege in the context of a
criminal investigation:
The interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and
entitled to great respect. However, we cannot conclude that advisers
will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the in-
frequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such
conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal prosecu-
tion.A'
The Court's decision could hardly be described as less than definitive.
Harkening back to Marbury v. Madison,32 Burger's opinion reaffirmed
judicial supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation.3 The
White House had played its last card and lost, leaving the President
with few options. Whatever damaging information the tapes held
would soon come to public light in the coverup trial. Few, however,
expected the disclosures to end the Nixon presidency so suddenly.
Mr. Nixon's resignation brought an end to his administration, but
its aftermath left the Special Prosecutor to wrestle with the extra-
ordinary problem of disposing of charges against a former President.
The members of the special prosecution force favored indictment,
believing that only prosecution, however distasteful the process, could
dissuade Richard Nixon from arguing to history that political
chicanery, not evidence of criminal complicity, drove him from office.
Although he believed that a fair trial of the former President might
not be possible for many months, Jaworski was reconciled to the
prospect of indicting Nixon. He was not disappointed, however, by
the pardon granted by President Gerald Ford on September 8, 1974.
The pardon generated an outpouring of dissatisfaction. But after
careful review, Jaworski concluded that " '[t]he provision in the Consti-
tution investing the President with the right to grant pardons, and
the recognition by the United States Supreme Court that a pardon
may be granted prior to the filing of charges are so clear, in my opinion,
as not to admit of doubt. -4 A short time later that position was
31. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974).
32. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. For a discussion of the implications of judicial review of cases involving claims
of presidential privilege, see Nathanson, From Watergate to Marbury v. Madison:
Some Reflections on Presidential Privilege in Current Historical Perspectives, 16 ARiz.
L. REv. 59 (1974); Strong, President, Congress, Courts: One is More Equal than the
Others, 60 A.B.A.J. 1203 (1974).
34. JAWORSKI, supra note 5, at 248. The quotation appeared in a letter to then
Acting Attorney General William Saxbe,
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vindicated by the Supreme Court when it held in Schick v. Reed s"
that the presidential pardoning power is virtually unlimited.3 6
Although Jaworski was not anxious to seek an indictment against
the former President, he leaves the reader little doubt as to his view
of Mr. Nixon's role in the Watergate coverup conspiracy. Indeed, the
prospect of an exculpatory Nixon memoir seems to underlie
Jaworski's detailed discussion of the former President's involvement.
His purpose in writing the book might be traced to a memorandum
prepared by a special prosecution staff attorney shortly after Nixon's
resignation.
The prospect of Mr. Nixon publishing his memoirs (and thereby
adding several million dollars to his net worth) should remind us
that unlike his aides who are convicted of crimes Mr. Nixon will
have the "last say" about his own role in Watergate if he is not
prosecuted. This is why. . . it is important (absent a full admission
of guilt) to have some definitive resolution of Mr. Nixon's Water-
gate actions."T
Former President Nixon left office with no admission of guilt, and his
pardon leaves little likelihood of a definitive resolution of his involve-
ment in the coverup conspiracy. Jaworski's book, therefore, appears
to have been consciously written as an "anticipatory rebuttal" to a
Nixon memoir which might argue that political hysteria rather than
criminal complicity brought about his downfall.
The Right and the Power will bring small pleasure to those who be-
lieve that Mr. Nixon was unfairly hounded from office. Jaworski goes to
great lengths to expose the abuses of the Nixon White House and to
detail the former President's personal culpability. The author describes
the entire Watergate affair as unparalleled American tragedy, yet indi-
cates that he emerged from the ordeal with renewed respect for the
nation's democratic institutions. Although the book chronicles rampant
wrongdoing at the highest levels of government, it is also a compelling
testament to the strength of the American legal system. To those
concerned about the state of the law and the legal profession, The
Right and the Power is recommended reading.
35. 419 U.S. 256 (1974). In Schick, the Supreme Court upheld former President
Eisenhower's reduction of a death sentence imposed by court-martial to life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole.
36. Id. at 266. The Court found that the President's power to pardon is virtually
unlimited so long as conditions imposed do not offend the Constitution.
37. JAwORSIg, supra note 5, at 227.
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CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION: AN INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION &c TRIAL
MANUAL. By Andrew J. Ruzicho.1 Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing
Co., 1976. Pp. xvii, 372. $35.00.
Reviewed by P. Kent Spriggs2
In the "Introduction" to Civil Rights Litigation, the author states
that the book is written to aid "investigators, negotiators, and trial
attorneys." It is doubtful that it would be of much use to investigators.
Its use in the legal profession is limited to law students- and those
who are just beginning to get their litigating feet wet.
The book is 322 pages long, with an additional 50 pages of index.
Of the 322 pages, only 180 are text; the rest are appendices. The text
is divided into "Investigation" and "Trial." The book proceeds
chronologically, from the setting up of a case file to the conclusion of
the trial. The author discusses pre-litigation investigation and the
peculiarities of various kinds of civil rights litigation. The rules on
discovery are then reviewed seriatim.
The "Trial" chapter has a short introduction followed by a section
on the trial notebook, a long section on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and fifteen more sections full of pontifications and some helpful hints
on various aspects of trying a case. Much of the material in these
sections is directed at the rudiments of trial practice in general and
not civil rights litigation in particular. The appendices include model
pleadings; sixty-three pages of forms, statutes, and regulations on Ohio
law and practice; information on damage awards and attorneys fees;
and twenty-eight pages of case citations.
This book can serve the student or inexperienced practitioner.
Because its organization follows the chronological progression of a
case, it lends itself to use as a manual to which the reader can refer
at each stage of the litigation. It differs somewhat from the otherwise
similar treatments in American Jurisprudence Trials3 and American
Jurisprudence Proof of Facts,4 in that the text is devoid of statutes
and case law. The only law appears in citations in the "Appendices."
*The reader using the book as a manual would thus be forced to seek
out authority which supports the general instructions. In this regard,
the reader interested in employment discrimination litigation is
1. Andrew J. Ruzicho received his J.D. from Ohio Northern University, College
of Law, 1967. He presently serves in the Office of the Attorney General as Chief of the
Civil Rights Section.
2. Member, Florida Bar.
3 ". E.g., 21 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1 (1974) (Employment Discrimination).
4. E.g., 2 AM. JUR. pVRooFOF FACTS 2D 187 (1974) (Racial Discrimination in Employ-
ment).
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commended to a carefully edited primer, Legal Services Manual for
Title VII Litigation, prepared by the National Employment Law
Project (1973). The CCH (Commerce Clearing House) EEOC Com-
pliance Manual can be used in a similar manner. For exhaustive re-
search, the CCH Employment Practices Decisions and the BNA (Bureau
of National Affairs) Fair Employment Practices gather the cases,
statutes, regulations, and administrative opinions in looseleaf form.
The interview checklists are helpful only as suggestions. As a result
of much too casual preparation, the checklists are not systematic. The
section entitled "Public Employers-Interview with Complainant and
Other Persons Similarly Situated" is notably deficient in failing to
alert the interviewer to the many peculiarities of the government as
an employer.
Few aspects of legal education are as sterile as civil procedure
taught by the case method. A sense of the dynamics of civil pro-
cedure cannot be learned by reading cases. This is especially true of
discovery-the heart of employment discrimination litigation. Thus,
the author is definitely on the right track in introducing the reader
to the practical side of the discovery rules and how they can be used.
Civil procedure instruction in law school has generally failed to
present mock depositions, require the drafting of interrogatories, and
explain things which are not in the rules or reported decisions-such
as the fact that at most depositions counsel waive the formalities.
The author's treatment of discovery is passable. For instance,
students generally have little sense of how to integrate the various
discovery devices. There is little said in law school about the strengths
and weaknesses of each discovery tool and the order in which they
may be used most profitably. The author speaks of the value to the
plaintiff of taking early depositions, in that the defense may not at
that point realize the legal consequences of the information it is giving
on depositions. Unfortunately, the author does not discuss the vital
importance of having one's massive statistical compendia completed
before taking the depositions of key company officials. This is crucial
because the plaintiff will probably be limited to only one deposition
per official.
The appendices on discovery are but one example of the less
than diligent scholarship which characterizes this book. The author
has included as Appendix B a Motion for Production of Documents.
No such motion has existed since the change in the Federal Rules in
1970. The author incorrectly reproduced a 1968 motion. Inspection
is now done by notice.5 In text, the author discusses the procedure as
5. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (amended 1970).
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one of notice, but in the interrogatories, Appendices C and D, the
author alludes to a fifteen-day period for response. Again, this has
not been the rule since 1970.6 Thus, extreme caution is urged upon
the practitioner who would hand these forms to the secretary as some
do with formbooks.
The choice of complaints is also inappropriate. Because the com-
plaints chosen were filed by the United States, there is no discussion
of the 42 iJ.S.C. § 1981 cause of action, 7 or of jurisdiction of the court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.1 These are, of course, key sections for the
private practitioner at whom the book is aimed.
There is discussion of the use of computers to adduce data, but no
suggestion as to the importance of ascertaining by interrogatory the
basic data about what is stored in the computer. Concern is expressed
about getting documentary exhibits admitted, but no mention is made
of the fact that one can attach documentary exhibits to a request to
admit and resolve these questions long in advance of trial. (It is good
to attach interrogatories to the requests, asking that all disagreements
be spelled out with particularity; the author does this in Appendix D
but does not discuss the procedure.)
In addition to inaccurate scholarship, there is a great deal of
padding. A good example is the thirty-two-page section on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Most of the rules are repeated verbatim. The
author justifies this by purporting to "comment" on the Rules "where
a particular civil rights problem exists" [p. 88]. Many of the rules have
no comment, however, casting doubt on the necessity of their inclu-
sion. Many of the comments are not reflective of civil rights problems.
Lastly, some are not at all well-taken. For instance, Rule 302 on "Ap-
plicability of State Law in Civil Cases" has as the only "comment" the
citation to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.9 This citation may throw the
unwitting practitioner off the track. Substantive civil rights law is
almost exclusively federal law when practiced in the federal courts.
Yet Erie deals with those claims in federal court which have their
source in state law. Thus, the reader may research state law on pre-
sumptions when a proper determination is a matter of federal law in
this federal question litigation. Moreover, there is no justification for
the sixty-three pages of Ohio laws, regulations, and forms which appear
in the appendix.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (amended 1970). The time limit since 1970 is 30 days. id.
7. Section 1981 grants to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
equal rights and like penalties and taxes under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
8. Section 1343 vests jurisdiction in the federal district courts for civil rights
actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The twenty-seven pages of case citations are poorly organized and
poorly planned. The reference to back pay as "damages" is inappropri-
ate."' For some unknown reason, "validation" cases are placed in the
middle of the "recruitment" cases.', Furthermore, "Religious Dis-
crimination" and "National Origin Discrimination" are subheadings
under "Special Problems Regarding Sex Discrimination." "Discrimina-
tion on an Individual Basis" omits Cooper v. Allen 2 a seminal case
on burden-shifting in trials. "Irrelevancy of Intent" is incorrectly listed
as a defense. Intent or its irrelevance is an element of the claim. The
low quantum of intent consistently required in civil rights litigation
(until Washington v. Davis") has been a part of the plaintiff's strength.
In the remedies section, there is no mention of "front pay," one of the
newer spectacular remedies, nor is there any indication that "bump-
ing" may be ordered for an individual plaintiff.14
Lastly, the author alludes to the "emotional and social aspects of
the practice of civil rights laws" [p. vii] but demonstrates little sensi-
tivity to those same aspects. He advocates invoking the Exclusion of
Witnesses rule 5 in civil rights litigation, with little feeling for the
political importance of worker-witnesses seeing the boss taken to task.
He demonstrates no sensitivity to the deep fear which many worker-
witnesses may have about confronting their employers, and none to
.10. "Damages" necessarily connotes legal relief rather than equitable relief. The
federal courts have uniformly determined that backpay is equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &: Rubber Co., Synthetic Rubber Plant, 491 F.2d 1364 (5th
Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). The
implications of this characterization are substantial. Two obvious illustrations are the
preclusion of jury trials on such claims, and the fact that class actions seeking back
pay are still characterized as FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) rather than FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
actions. The 23(b)(2) characterization can be tactically advantageous because it means,
among other things, that mandatory notice in Stage I proceedings is not required, as
would be the case in a 23(b)(3) action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
11. "Recruitment" is concerned with what recruiting and hiring methods are
legally permissible, and also with situations in which recruitment is mandated as a
remedy. "Validation" is the process by which the proponent of a testing device justifies
the instrument even though its use has a substantial adverse impact on an affected class.
12. 467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972), afJ'd on rehearing, 493 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
14. "Front pay" is a remedy which is growing in recognition. The term describes
potentially lost earnings from judgment day until that day in the future when the
class member reaches his "rightful place." The leading case mandating "front pay"
is Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976). See also Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., PCA 73-45 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 1976).
"Bumping" is a remedy which allows the Wronged plaintiff to "bump" the incum-
bent out of the job which had been awarded illegally. "Bumping" has not been used
on a class-wide basis but has been used in individual cases. See, e.g., Griffiths v. Hamp-
ton, 12 1E.P.D. 11,038 (D.D.C. 1976).
15. FED. R. EvIv. 615.
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the utility of allowing witnesses to view the proceedings. In a burst
of professionalism, he asks that pretrial not be crowded with clients,
failing to recognize the importance of affording the claimants an
opportunity to see how their rights are being determined. Further,
he has no sense of the effect that one or two hundred spectators may
have on the decision-making process of the judge.
The author has been a government lawyer for both the United
States and the State of Ohio. His lack of concern for the political im-
pact of the litigation on the client class and on the community in
which it takes place is reflective of the government's litigation posture
in school desegregation and employment. The United States govern-
ment has shown little awareness that a plenary school desegregation
suit necessarily disrupts the established social structure of the com-
munity, and that community involvement is vital to avoid the racist
backlash and ripple effects that often accompany reorganization of
intra-community relationships. His approach is therefore not surpris-
ing-but nonetheless sad.
[Vol. 5
